Dhaka [Bangladesh]: The political landscape of South Asia is facing fresh turbulence following Bangladesh’s dramatic leadership change last August, when mass protests—led by an unlikely coalition of student groups, civil society activists, and radical Islamists—culminated in the resignation of long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.
Stepping into the political vacuum was Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mohammed Yunus, globally celebrated for his work in microfinance. Appointed as interim leader, Yunus’s rise was initially met with optimism, hailed as an opportunity to unify a divided nation. However, that optimism is rapidly fading.
Yunus’s growing accommodation of Islamist groups and his administration’s strategic pivot toward China and Pakistan have sparked anxiety within Bangladesh and heightened concerns across the region—particularly in India, a long-time strategic partner.
“Yunus seems either unwilling or incapable of reining in the Islamist zealots who are increasingly coming to the fore in Bangladesh,” wrote Sumit Ganguly, Foreign Policy columnist and senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.
One of Yunus’s most controversial moves has been the lifting of the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamist political party accused of atrocities during the 1971 Liberation War. Under Hasina, the party had been marginalized in favor of a secular governance model and strong India-Bangladesh ties. The new administration’s softer tone toward Islamist elements has coincided with a surge in mob violence targeting religious minorities, including Hindus and Ahmadiyyas, raising red flags about growing religious intolerance.
Analysts warn that such trends could have spillover effects into neighboring northeastern India, exacerbating communal tensions and sparking cross-border instability.
Adding to regional unease is Yunus’s recent diplomatic overture to China. During a high-profile visit to Beijing, the Bangladeshi leader reportedly offered strategic maritime access to the Bay of Bengal, a move Indian officials see as a direct threat to New Delhi’s regional maritime dominance.
“Bangladesh is the guardian of ocean access,” Yunus said—remarks that, according to sources, caught Indian diplomats off guard.
India has long viewed Chinese infrastructure investments in South Asia—including ports in Sri Lanka, road networks in Nepal, and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—with caution. The potential for Bangladesh to fall into a similar “debt-trap” scenario has further alarmed Indian policymakers.
Despite decades of cooperation, some analysts argue that India’s inconsistent diplomatic engagement has opened the door for Beijing to expand its influence in Dhaka.
“If India continues with business as usual, it risks losing a vital partner,” warned a senior Indian diplomat. “There is an urgent need for renewed outreach—through trade, strategic investments, and deeper security cooperation.”
As Yunus navigates a volatile domestic and international environment, his government’s choices may reshape not only Bangladesh’s future, but the broader balance of power in South Asia. With Islamist forces emboldened and Chinese interests deepening, India faces the pressing task of reasserting its influence in a region increasingly up for grabs.
“If Bangladesh falls under greater Islamist influence and becomes a beachhead for Chinese interests,” concluded Ganguly, “India could find itself isolated in its own neighbourhood.”
The coming months may prove decisive in determining whether Bangladesh remains a bridge of cooperation—or transforms into a fault line of regional instability.