China’s Expanding Space Power: A Growing Strategic Challenge For The U.S.

With vast investments and a fleet of more than 1,060 satellites, China is rapidly emerging as a formidable rival to U.S. space operations and national security interests, marking space as a key domain in its military strategy.

Under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, China views space not just as a scientific frontier but as a military theatre equal to land, sea, and air. The U.S. Space Force, in its April fact sheet, starkly warned that “China is the pacing challenge,” highlighting Beijing’s rapidly growing capabilities aimed at tracking and targeting U.S. military forces in space.

🚀 Explosive Satellite Growth and Intelligence Reach

China’s space activity has surged dramatically:

• 68 launches in 2023 alone, placing 260 payloads into orbit.
• Of these, 67 satellites (26%) are capable of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).
• Over the last decade, China’s on-orbit presence rose by 620%, from just 185 satellites in 2015 to more than 1,060 in 2025.
• Around 510 satellites now serve the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), providing imaging and data via optical, radar, and radio-frequency sensors.

A prime example is the TJS-12 satellite, launched into geosynchronous orbit in December 2024, which the U.S. believes allows persistent surveillance of U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific.

🛰️ Communications Constellations Rivaling Starlink

China is also replicating and challenging Starlink with:

• The G60 LEO constellation, with 72 satellites already in orbit and 648 planned by the end of 2025.
• Another 13,000-satellite constellation under the China Satellite Network Group.
• Long-term ambitions to launch 14,000 G60 satellites by 2030.

After witnessing Ukraine’s use of Starlink, China fears the implications of commercial satellite networks during wartime.

🎯 Space-Based Targeting and Strike Capabilities

China’s expanding satellite network enhances long-range precision strike capability, linking ISR with missile guidance systems. This integration poses significant threats to U.S. aircraft carriers, bases, and global military operations.

The PLA’s space-focused evolution began in 2015 with the creation of the Strategic Support Force, now replaced in 2024 by the PLA Aerospace Force, a new military branch directly reporting to China’s Central Military Commission (CMC).

🛡️ PLA Aerospace Force: China’s Military Space Machine

This force controls seven major “space bases”:

1. Base 23 – Maritime tracking and control (Jiangsu)
2. Base 25 – Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre (Shanxi)
3. Base 26 – Xi’an Satellite Control Centre (Shaanxi)
4. Base 27 – Xichang Launch Centre (Sichuan)
5. Base 35 – Battlefield Environment Support (Wuhan)
6. Base 36 – Equipment R&D and testing (Kaifeng)
7. Base 37 – Early warning, debris tracking, and missile detection (Lintong)

These bases oversee satellite launches, radar surveillance, and anti-satellite (ASAT) planning.

🧨 Counter-Space Capabilities & ASAT Threat

China is advancing offensive space warfare:

• ASAT missile tested in 2007, creating long-lasting debris.
• Development of ASATs targeting even geosynchronous orbit (36,000 km).
• Shijian-21 (SJ-21) satellite used in 2022 to move another satellite—demonstrating potential satellite “grappling” capability.

China is also investing in:

• Laser weapons to dazzle or destroy satellite sensors.
• Electronic jammers to disrupt U.S. satellite communications, including GPS and military bands.
• Highly manoeuvrable satellites like TJS-2 moving at speeds of 44 m/s, which could be used for proximity operations or attacks.

🛰️ Reusable Spaceplanes and Responsive Launch

China has:

• Conducted three reusable spaceplane missions, with the last two staying in orbit for nine months each and releasing unknown objects.
• Tested reusable launch vehicle technology, including vertical take-off-and-landing systems.
• Plans for “responsive space” launch, enabling satellites to be launched rapidly in wartime.

🧠 Strategic Implications

John Costello of The Jamestown Foundation identifies key implications:

1. Space is central to PLA warfare, not auxiliary.
2. The Aerospace Force enables faster decision-making, unified targeting, and improved ISR capabilities.
3. It emphasizes space control, actively preparing for both defensive and offensive warfare in space.

The doctrine guiding these preparations is clear: “No satellite, no fight.” This underscores the vulnerability of both China and the U.S. in any space-based military confrontation.

⚔️ The Coming Space Race Isn’t Peaceful

Despite China’s claims of peaceful intentions, the scale, secrecy, and military alignment of its space assets indicate otherwise. The US Space Force assesses that the PLA is preparing to deny access to space for its adversaries, especially the U.S., in the event of a regional conflict such as Taiwan.

As China’s capability to disrupt and dominate space strengthens, the U.S. and its allies face a new battlefield — one beyond the sky but central to future wars.